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1. INTRODUCTION
In December 1991, the Soviet Union, the nation that had
opposed the United States in a monumental cold war
lasting for more than fifty years, abruptly collapsed. The
world looked on in astonishment as the Soviet empire, with
its history of communist dictatorship and military produc-
tion, disintegrated virtually overnight. Hope and optimism
that the Cold War had finally ended accompanied the fall
of the Soviet regime.1 People everywhere believed that the
risk of global nuclear annihilation existing throughout the
Cold War had at last been eliminated.2 Never before,
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James E. Goodby, the U.S. Negotiator on Safe and Secure
Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons, noted that "[tlhe independence of
new states and the end of the confrontation between East and West
were hopeful events. The end of the Cold War and the burden it placed
on peoples everywhere could only be a welcome historical turning
point." James E. Goodby, Averting Nuclear Chaos: The Tasks Before Us,
4 DEPT ST. DISPATCH 704, 704 (1993) (publishing the Address Before
the UN Symposium on Security Disarmament and Confidence-Building
in the CIS Context given on September 28, 1993).
2 To nations on both sides of the ideological divide, the end of the
Cold War signalled the dawn of a new era in which cooperation and
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however, had a government that possessed 30,000 nuclear
warheads and bombs, spread across its vast territory,
completely disappeared.' The ultimate fate of these
nuclear weapons is an issue of global concern, for the "end
of the Cold War counts only if [the threat of] nuclear war -
the almost unimaginable horror that made the Cold War
what it was - also is ended."4
In the wake of the Soviet empire's fall, Russia and the
other newly independent states5 have experienced rapid
social, political, and legal disintegration.' To a great
degree, Soviet citizens had grown accustomed to more than
seventy years of authoritarian Soviet dictatorship. The
sudden collapse of communism, therefore, created an
enormous power vacuum in Russian society, left to be filled
partnership in peace would replace hostility and suspicion. See id.
' See Igor Levin, Where Have All the Weapons Gone? The Common-
wealth of Independent States' Struggle to Stop the Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and the New Role of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, 24 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 957, 957 (1992); see also Goodby,
supra note 1, at 704 (arguing that an "enormously difficult and
threatening challenge [is determining] the fate of some 30,000 nuclear
weapons dispersed throughout the former Soviet Union").
' The Weapon of Choice: Diplomacy is a Winner as U.S. Gets Kaz-
akhstan's Military-Grade Uranium, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at B4
(arguing for continued diplomacy to counter global nuclear threats, the
editorial notes that "the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the
totalitarian control that Moscow had maintained over its citizens has
reatly raised the potential for nuclear smuggling and nuclear
blckmail").
' The Commonwealth of Independent States ("CIS") consists of 11
of the 15 former Soviet republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The nations of Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and
Lithuania chose not to join. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Russia to Be Sole
Nuclear Republic: Other Ex-Soviet States Agree to Destruction of
Strategic Missiles, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1992, at Al.
6 The nuclear weapons and infrastructure left over from the Soviet
empire
were scattered throughout several new states that were in a
complete state of political, economic, and military flux.
Hundreds of thousands of people working in this industry
[were] affected and [faced] social, professional, and economic
upheaval almost beyond comprehension. Such a situation had
never before occurred, nor had been seriously contemplated.
Goodby, supra note 1, at 704.
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by any group that could seize the opportunity. This void
has provided organized criminal syndicates with a chance
to achieve unprecedented strength and influence in the
former Soviet republics. Organized crime has become one
of the most dangerous forces arising from the collapse of the
Soviet system.8
At the same time, fissile materials,9 the raw materials
of nuclear weapons, recently have become available for sale
on the European black market. In August 1994, German
police seized the largest recovery to date of such material in
a Munich train station.10 Although it has not been proven
definitively, the materials discovered in Europe most likely
originated in Russian nuclear facilities."
7 One such group is Russia's new upper class. Tremendously
materialistic and far wealthier than most Russians, who earn an
average monthly income of $100, they have turned former socialist
enterprises they managed into private companies. Alternatively, they
have simply extended the criminal trading that they had been
conducting under the Soviet system. See Dorinda Elliott, Lifestyles of
Russia's Filthy New Rich, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 19, 1994, at 42, 42.
8 See International Organized Crime and Its Impact on the United
States: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of
the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs (May 25, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Nunn), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinaf-
ter Nunn Statement]. Organized crime may ultimately pose a threat
to peace not only in Russia, but in other regions of the world as well.
Thus, it is becoming both a domestic law enforcement nightmare and
a potential threat to international security. See id. For example,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin noted in 1994 that "organized crime is
trying to take [Russia] by the throat." Id.
' This Comment uses the phrase "fissile material" to refer to weap-
ons-grade plutonium or uranium (more specifically highly enriched
uranium or "HEU"). These fissile materials are some of the materials
necessary to build a nuclear weapon. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Wild
East, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1994, at 61, 68.
10 Twelve ounces of plutonium-239 were seized in Munich on August
10, 1994, which is almost enough to make a nuclear bomb. See Tom
Masland, For Sale, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 1994, at 30, 30. Moreover,
that amount of fissile material could have been used for other harmful
purposes. "The Munich seizure contained more than enough plutonium
to poison all of a city's water supply, or to make a devastating 'dirty
bomb' that would disperse radioactive particles in the air." See id.
1 In August 1994, Newsweek reported that there "was little doubt
that the deadliest substances known to man have leaked from cracks
in the former Soviet Union's massive nuclear infrastructure." Russian
officials, however, vehemently deny this assertion. Id.; see also infra
notes 152-53 and accompanying text (noting the discovery of the first
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There is strong evidence that organized crime in the
former Soviet Union is seeking access to the nuclear
stockpiles because of their potential for enormous profit.
12
This Comment analyzes the potential nuclear threat from
organized criminal groups in Russia and the link between
organized crime and Russian nuclear-weapons security.
Section 2 discusses the recent discoveries of fissile
material on the European black market, widely believed to
have come from former Sovet nuclear facilities. Section 3
investigates the exponential growth of organized crime in
Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Section 4
analyzes the link between the recent appearance of fissile
material for sale in Europe and the massive rise in power
of organized criminal groups in Russia. Section 5 discusses
the obstacles in combatting the related problems of nuclear
proliferation and Russian organized crime. This section
also suggests possible cooperative actions that can be taken
to help Russia control organized crime and stem its radioac-
tive flow.
2. FISSILE MATERIAL APPEARS IN EUROPE
2.1. Black Market Nuclear Dealings: A Very Real Threat
There are two heavy metal elements suitable for making
a nuclear fission explosive device. The first, uranium,
occurs naturally in ore; the second, plutonium-239 ("plutoni-
um"), does not occur in nature and must be created from
uranium. 3 Police in Europe recently have intercepted
hard evidence that Russian organized criminal groups have attempted
to smuggle nuclear material from former Soviet facilities).
12 See Hersh, supra note 9, at 68; see also MacNeil/Lehrer News-
Hour: Deadly Market; Breaking the Cycle (PBS television broadcast,
Aug. 17, 1994) (transcript #5034), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Script File [hereinafter MacNeillLehrer] (noting that "the sheer
proliferation of nuclear material remaining in the former Soviet Union
and the seemingly increasing amounts of it appearing for sale is
creating a new post-Cold War threat for Western governments, a
problem of the modern age to which as yet there is no obvious
solution").
1 See John M. Deutch, The New Nuclear Threat, FOREIGN AFF., Fall
1992, at 120, 121. A nation can obtain fissile nuclear material either
by enriching uranium-235 by an isotope separation technique or by
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both of these elements, uncovering ninety instances of
nuclear smuggling in Germany in the first half of 1994
alone.14
Black market nuclear dealings in high-grade material
may be the most significant security threat to the West in
the post-Cold War era, but until August 1994, Western
nations considered them a purely hypothetical risk.15 For
several years prior to 1994, police in Europe reported a
string of nuclear smuggling cases, some cases involving
large amounts of low-level radioactive material. It was only
the recent seizure in Germany, in which police intercepted
high-grade material, however, that confirmed some Western
predictions that fissile material sufficient to build a nuclear
weapon could become available on the black market. 6
Since the 1994 German seizure, the threat of global
nuclear proliferation has displaced the fear of superpower
nuclear conflict on the international agenda. 7 There are
numerous reasons why the risk of spreading nuclear
capability poses a major, and relatively new, threat to world
security. 8
producing plutonium-239 in a nuclear reactor, followed by chemical
separation. Id. at 122.
"4 See 90 Instance of Nuke Smuggling in Germany in First Half of
1994, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File [hereinafter Nuke Smuggling]. In addition,
since the middle of 1994, authorities have announced five major cases
of nuclear smuggling from Russia. See Robert L. Hotz, Cold War Foes
Forge Warn Ties, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at Al, A30.
"5 See Masland, supra note 10, at 30.
16 Until the summer of 1994,
nearly all of a fast-growing number of nuclear smuggling cases
involved low-grade materials passed off by con artists as the
real thing. But a string of new cases has given credence to a
nightmare scenario - that some of the hundreds of tons of
plutonium in Russia could fall into the hands of mobsters, [or]
terrorists.
Id. In July 1995, for example, a German judge convicted two Spaniards
and a Colombian of smuggling from Moscow the plutonium discovered
last August in Munich. ee Mary W. Walsh, German Court Convicts 3
for Smuggling Plutonium, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1995, at A2.
'7 Deutch, supra note 13, at 120.
18 First, it is feared that as the number of nuclear powers increases,
the chances that nuclear weapons may be used will grow concomitantly.
See Adam Treiger, Plugging the Russian Brain Drain: Criminalizing
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Iraq's covert nuclear build-up, which eventually led to
the Persian Gulf War, provides a poignant example of the
threat posed by nuclear proliferation. As the world now
knows, Iraq mounted a massive covert program to acquire
nuclear weapons and other tools of mass destruction. 9
Leaders outside that country would have never known how
close Iraq was to having a nuclear weapon had Saddam
Hussein not attacked Kuwait.20 Iraq had violated nuclear
non-proliferation treaties with impunity and stood poised to
threaten severely international security.21
The collapse of the Soviet Union adds a new element to
the proliferation problem. The empire's fall removes the
influence of a strong central government that was relatively
responsible in its control of nuclear weapons and technolo-
gy22 The recent appearance of nuclear materials for sale
in Europe, believed to have originated from Russian
facilities, dramatically illustrates the dangerous conse-
quences of this change.2"
Nuclear-Expertise Proliferation, 82 GEO. L.J. 237, 239, n.11 (1993)
(quoting Leonard S. Spector, A Historical and Technical Introduction to
the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTL
PEACE, June 1992, at 3-4). Second, the use of nuclear weapons by a
regional power in a localized conflict could dramatically increase the
human costs of such hostilities. See id. Third, the acquisition of
nuclear arms by unstable regimes has raised the prospect that
inadequate command and control systems might lead to the unauthor-
ized use of nuclear weapons during a crisis, or that other "non-state
actors," such as terrorist groups, might gain control of nuclear weapons,
thereby opening new avenues for nuclear mayhem. Id.
19 See Deutch, supra note 13, at 120.
20 Governments and international organizations for the most part
were ignorant of Iraqi intentions and capabilities leading up to the
Persian Gulf War. See id.
2" See Levin, supra note 3, at 977; see also Richard L. Williamson,
Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime
to Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 82-83
(1995) (noting that Iraq's covert acquisition of extensive nuclear
weapons technology, while publicly appearing to be in compliance with
the international non-proliferation treaties, revealed weaknesses in the
current non-proliferation regime). For a discussion of international
non-proliferation treaties, see infra section 5.2.
22 Deutch, supra note 13, at 120.
2 For example, the recent arrest of three men in New York for
attempting to sell several tons of zirconium, a metal used in nuclear
processing, demonstrates how the collapse of the Soviet Union has made
it easier to obtain nuclear material throughout the world. Federal
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2.2. The Origin of Black Market Fissile Material
On August 18, 1994, William Potter, the Director of the
Monterey Institute for International Studies, warned that
"the West has been extraordinarily fortunate to date to
have avoided a flood of nuclear contraband from the former
Soviet Union, but I think that our luck has just run out."
2 4
In 1994, from May through August, German police, on four
separate occasions, seized radioactive samples that they
believed originated in Russian nuclear facilities." These
major seizures were not the first of their kind. Early in
1993, for example, the Western media reported a fear that
the "now steady flow of non-sensitive material is ...
greasing the wheels for the real thing - the hundreds of
tons of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium stored
around the former Soviet Union."26  The most recent
seizures of fissile material lend a great degree of credence
to the view, long-held by many Western observers, that the
possibility of a black market for fissile material is frighten-
agents uncovered the black market operation by posing as repre-
sentatives of the Iraqi government and offering to buy the material.
The zirconium originated in a Ukrainian nuclear plant near Kiev and
customs agents said that its transfer may have been aided by Russian
organized crime. See John J. Goldman & William C. Rempel, U.S.
Seizes 7 Tons of Vital Reactor Metal, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1995, at Al,
A33; Michael Blood, Agents Posing as Iraqis Buy 8 Tons of Nuclear-Re-
lated Metal, AP WORLDSTREAM, June 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text
for other examples.
24 Dan Charles, Analysts Search for Origin of Smuggled Plutonium,
(National Public Radio, morning edition, Aug. 18, 1994) (transcript #
1414-13), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
' See Danger on the Black Market, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 28,
1994, at 87A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File. "In one
case, the bearer of the material was arrested in Munich after flying
non-stop from Moscow." Id.
26 Claire Shipman, ?uclear Entrepreneurs' Proliferate in Former
USSR (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 18, 1993) (transcript # 280-5),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. There were 241
instances of nuclear trafficking recorded by the German police in 1993,
as compared with 158 instances in 1992 and 41 occurrences in 1991.
See Nuke Sinuggling, supra note 14.
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ingly real.27
There is no conclusive evidence to date that the nuclear
material seized in Europe has come from Russian stock-
piles. Indeed, some Russian officials adamantly insist that
"[n]ot a single gram of plutonium-239 has gone missing
from storage in Russia."28  Western experts, however,
flatly refute this assertion.29 They argue that the Rus-
sians have absolutely no accurate measure of the actual
quantity of unaccounted for material- 30 Western analysts
note that the Russian government has no way of knowing
whether any of its nuclear material is missing, largely
because of its ignorance regarding how much fissile materi-
al the former Soviet Union actually produced. 1
In an attempt to ascertain more precisely the serious-
ness of the smuggling problem, Western nuclear laborato-
ries have run analyses of fissile materials which help to
identify the origins of those materials. These tests are
useful because they narrow considerably the search for the
2 There are, however, some skeptics who deny the existence of a
nuclear black market altogether. For example, Andrew Duncan, a
nuclear-weapons policy analyst at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London, sees no indication of an underground
network placing orders in Russia. On August 17, 1994, Duncan stated
that "[t]he sellers seem pretty desperate, with samples of mostly
unusable quantities," and thus "[tihere is no evidence of a black market
for fissile material." See Thomas Lucey, Nuke Experts Doubt Russian
Plutonium Black Market Exists, DEFENSE NEWS, Aug. 22, 1994, at 8,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
' See Masland, supra note 10, at 31. Some Russians have even
suggested that "the West invented the leaks as part of a plot to take
over Russia's nuclear program." Id.; but see infra notes 152-53 and
accompanying text (indicating that U.S. journalists recently discovered
the first hard evidence linking Russian mafia groups to the theft of
nuclear material).
2 See Masland, supra note 10, at 31-32 (warning that the Russians
do not know how much nuclear material they currently possess); Mac-
Neil/Lehrer, supra note 12 (noting that the Russians have no knowl-
edge of how many nuclear weapons the former Soviet Union produced,
thus accounting for nuclear material that might have been lost or stolen
is practically impossible).
o See Masland, supra note 10, at 31; discussion infra section 5.3.
8' See Charles, supra note 24. William Potter notes that on a recent
trip to Minsk he was told by a "senior person in the nuclear industry"
that he could not "say precisely how much weapons-grade material they
had [in Minsk] because of their shoddy accounting practices." Id.
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type of facility from which the nuclear material could have
originated.32 This process can be used to distinguish
nuclear materials from one another by identifying each
substance's unique "fingerprint."" All initial results of
these analyses point to the former Soviet republics as the
source of the smuggled fissile materials. 4
3. THE GROWTH OF RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME SINCE
THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION
3.1. Organized Crime Replaces Communist Dictatorship
In the midst of the growing nuclear black market, a
rising criminal movement in the former Soviet Union adds
a potent element of danger to the already volatile atmo-
sphere in Eastern Europe. Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russian criminal groups have enjoyed an unparal-
leled rise in strength and power.35 Entrepreneurial crimi-
nal groups have seized upon an unprecedented opportunity
to command influence and have filled the void left by more
than seventy years of communist dictatorship." For
32 The German and U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories are conduct-
ing isotopic analyses of the fissile material, looking for "trace isotopes
that would indicate.., that the material came from a reactor that has
been eradicated for a period of time, [or] that has been reprocessed."
MacNeil/Lehrer, supra note 12. The material contains signatures that
identify the type of application that produced the material, thus
narrowing down considerably the search for the facility in which it was
made. See id. These signatures are called "fingerprints" in the trade.
See id.
33 Id.
4 See id.
3 See Brian Duffy & Jeff Trimble, The Wise Guys of Russia, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 7, 1994, at 41, 43 (indicating that more
than 100 criminal syndicates now play a part in nearly every commer-
cial activity in Russia); Michael Elliott et al., Global Mafia, NEWsWEEK,
Dec. 13, 1993, at 22, 23 (noting that the collapse of communism has led
to the rebirth of the profit motive and has created fertile ground for
organized criminal syndicates); Hersh, supra note 9, at 66-86 (discuss-
ing the exponential growth of organized crime in Russia since 1991 and
the threat that it poses to both personal safety and international securi-
ty).
36 See Nunn Statement, supra note 8 ("While crime, and even
organized criminal activity, is nothing new in Russian history, the
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
several decades during the Cold War, Western nations
feared the threat posed by the nations of the Warsaw Pact.
Today, these Western nations are quick to argue that the
world is an even more turbulent and uncertain place than
during the Cold War." Russian organized crime has
taken over the dominant role formerly filled by the Soviet
Communist Party, possibly posing the greatest current
threat to international security.
In the wake of communism's demise, Russia and the
other newly independent states have experienced rapid
social, economic, and political disintegration. When
communism collapsed and the borders of former communist
countries opened, the criminals were the first to appreciate
that in the new world they very quickly could become richer
than they had ever imagined."8 Organized crime has since
become a problem of major significance in every aspect of
Russian society.3 9 In a report delivered to President
demise of [clommunism has created an opportunity for organized crime
groups to achieve unprecedented strength and influence in Russian
society. Unfortunately, it is an opportunity of which they appear to be
taking full advantage."); see also Mob Rule in Russia, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 11, 1995, at 86 ("A civil society barely emancipated from the
totalitarian past finds itself subjected to a new master.").
"' International organized crime now frightens many policymakers
worldwide. Referring to such crime, Tim Wirth, the Undersecretary of
State for Global Affairs remarked, "We have a problem that is
accelerating far beyond the ability of our current institutions." Elliott
et al., supra note 35, at 22. Moreover, Senator John Kerry believes that
"[o]rganized crime" is "the new communism, the new monolithic threat."
Id.
38 See id. at 23-30.
39 In November 1993, the Department of Energy's Office of Threat
Assessment conducted an analysis of the so-called Russian mafia. The
report cites "evidence showing that in 1991 about 4,000 organized-crime
groups or gangs were operating inside Russia." Hersh, supra note 9, at
66. The study included these findings:
* One quarter of the organized-crime groups are believed to
have ties to similar criminal groups abroad or in the former
Soviet republics....
* Forty percent of private businesses and 60 percent of
state-owned companies have been corrupted by organized crime.
* The Russian mafia may own half the nation's commercial
banks and 50 to 80 percent of the shops, hotels, warehouses,
depots, and service industries in Moscow. A substantial portion
of the commercial district in St. Petersburg is similarly in the
control of criminal elements, with businessmen being forced to
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Yeltsin in February 1994, Russia's Analytical Center for
Social and Economic Policies concluded that the situation of
organized crime in Russia differs from that in the West.40
The report states that in Western Europe and the United
States, "organized crime controls only 'criminal' activities
like prostitution, drugs[,] and gambling. In [Russia], it
controls all types of activities.""A
A number of social and political trends have combined to
form a new space for organized crime in Eastern Europe,
the most significant of which has been the collapse of
communism. 42 By replacing communism as the most
dangerous force emanating from the former Soviet Un-
ion,4' organized criminal networks have filled the void left
by the authoritarian government. To many Russians, the
rise of the mafia44 is simply "a logical outgrowth of the
Soviet past."'
5
pay 15 percent of their income for protection....
* Organized crime now uses high-tech communications equip-
ment, including fax machines, shortwave radios, and cellular
phones, far more sophisticated than anything used by Russian
law-enforcement officials.
Id. at 66-68.
40 See Duffy & Trimble, supra note 35, at 45.
41 Id.
42 See Elliott et al., supra note 35, at 22-23 (noting that, in addition
to the fall of communism, the development of computer and communica-
tions technology and the declining significance of national borders have
combined to form an open space for organized crime).
"' Richard Norton-Taylor, Still All to Play for in the Spying Game,
GUARDIAN (Manchester), Nov. 23, 1994, at 8 ("For the Warsaw Pact and
communism, now read the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and organised crime."). For further analysis of the link between the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and Russian organized crime, see dis-
cussion infra section 4.
44 The organizatsiya, or Russian organized criminal groups, have
been deemed the Russian "mafia." Russian police attribute most of
their nation's murder and violence to the mafia. See Duffy & Trimble,
supra note 35, at 43 (quoting Gennadi Chebotarev, the deputy head of
the Russian Interior Ministry's organized-crime section as saying, "We
have a large number of criminals, a massive number .... We can judge
that the number is large by the number of shootings that take place, by
the number of killings that take place.").
45 Id. at 45. Soviet secret police used mafia-like methods, such as
reporting to the krestnii otet, or "godfather." Id. In Soviet times,
however, "the godfather.., was the general secretary of the Commu-
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3.2. Lack of Legal Infrastructure
An additional factor facilitating the growth of organized
crime is the atmosphere of lawlessness that pervades
post-communist Russian society.46 When the Communists
ruled the Soviet Union, "'laws' were backed by a state that
was willing to use terror to enforce them."47 The collapse
of the communist regime undermined the power of such
laws.' In Russia today, the absence of regulation in many
areas of social conduct and the lack of force behind the laws
that do exist means that much activity that is criminal in
any real sense, including organized crime, is technically
legal.49  The weak Russian legal system thus greatly
hinders the ability of the Russian government to apprehend
and punish criminal offenders."
nist Party." Id. In addition, the communist leaders used organizations
such as the KGB, whose strongarm tactics resembled those of organjzed
crime, "to help [them] move [their] massive wealth within the Soviet
Union and abroad. In this respect ... Russians and citizens of the
former Soviet republics have been accustomed to mafia[-]like behavior
and mafia[-]like groups for decades." Id. at 45-46.
46 See, e.g., Elliott et al., supra note 35, at 27-30 (discussing the
lawless landscape of post-communist Russia).
47 Id. at 28.
48 See id.
41 See Hersh, supra note 9, at 79 ("[A]ctivities that are considered
unlawful according to Western norms, such as organized crime, are not
specifically prohibited.") (citation omitted); Sergei Komarov, the Deputy
Chief of the anticorruption division of the St. Petersburg police noted,
"I can call [the criminals] in and tell them to stop doing it... but all
I can do is wag my finger." Id.; see also Elliot et al., supra, note 35, at
27-30 (noting that there are no official laws against moneylaundering,
fraud, or organized crime).
" Former Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze empha-
sized that Russia needs "to create as soon as possible a moral and legal
environment in which anyone guilty of grave crimes against humanity
...[, including] acts of terrorism or torture ...[, cannot] escape
punishment and [will] not be absolved from personal responsibility."
John N. Moore & Robert F. Turner, The Principles of Cooperation and
Good Faith Fulfillment of International Obligations, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 275, 283 (Paul B. Stephan, III &
Boris M. Klimenko eds., 1991).
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4. THE LNK BETWEEN RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME AND
NUCLEAR-WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN EUROPE
4.1. Organized Crime Emerges from the Ruins of a
Nuclear Superpower
As noted above, Russian organized crime syndicates are
playing an ever larger role in controlling all aspects of
Russian society.5 While this situation leads to chaos and
fear within Russia, the potentially devastating influence
that these groups can exert over the entire global arena
stands as perhaps the greatest threat.5 2 One feature
distinguishes the danger of Russian organized crime from
that of any other organized criminal syndicate - the fact
that Russian organized crime is arising from the fertile soil
of a nuclear superpower.53 The economic and political
bedlam in Russia, combined with the nation's inheritance
of a nuclear arsenal, marks Russia as a paradise for
so-called "nuclear entrepreneurs."54
As predicted by some Western observers,55 Russian
5 See discussion supra section 3.1.
52 The Russian mafia is "hijacking the state" and poses a serious
threat to the government's control over its nuclear weapons. Hersh,
supra note 9, at 62. As a result, the enormous rise of Russian
organized crime is becoming a problem of international security, not
just personal safety. See id.
" See Nunn Statement, supra note 8. Senator Nunn warned that
no nuclear nation has ever come so close to internal chaos. See id. Yet
the world today faces "the prospect of the government of a nuclear state
fighting for its very survival against the forces of organized crime." Id.
Another U.S. official stated the matter differently, declaring that the
world now faces "a 1930s situation in Chicago, except that Al Capone
has access to nuclear weapons." Hersh, supra note 9, at 79.
"' Shipman, supra note 26. Even today, Russia faces a desperate
situation in which the economy is "falling apart" and Russians are
"under pressure to act for very crude economic interests." Id. This
situation creates an environment in which anyone will sell anything for
the right price. See id.
55 One commentator warned as early as 1976 that too little
attention had been given to the dramatic increase in organized criminal
violence and the increased "potential for such violence to become
nuclear." Jerry P. Coleman, International Safeguards Against
Non-Government Nuclear Theft:A Study of Legal Inadequacies, 10 INTL
LAW 493, 494 (1976) (emphasis omitted). Coleman added that any
"future nuclear thefts would increase the chances and motives for...
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organized crime networks have begun establishing their
presence in the black market for nuclear materials and
technology. For an organized crime operative who functions
without fear of apprehension," it is easy to see how "the
lucrative nature of a nuclear theft may well outweigh the
[potential] risks and sanctions."5 7 The "Russian atomic
mafia"58 thus is becoming increasingly visible and danger-
ous.
Russian organized criminal networks have targeted
former Soviet nuclear materials for theft and sale
abroad.59 Nuclear entrepreneurs take advantage of newly
opened and poorly policed borders, the possibility of
tremendous profits, and Russia's lack of accurate accounting
and inventory procedures.60 This "link between organized
crime and Russian nuclear-weapons security"6 ' quickly is
becoming a problem of both national and international
proportions. For this reason, any discussion of nuclear
proliferation of necessity must include the risk of organized
criminal proliferation.6"
a [nuclear black] market; once so formed, a black market would then
further increase the potential for nuclear theft." Id. at 495 n.4.
56 See discussion supra section 3.2.
5 Coleman, supra note 55, at 495. It has been estimated that a
kilo gram of plutonium can sell for as much as $500,000 on the open
market. See Another Nuclear Threat, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 22, 1994,
at A8, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File. With such high
market value, plutonium is quickly becoming a hot commodity in the
international criminal underworld. See id.
" Bernard Gray et al., From Russia with Love: Nuclear Smuggling
Has Put the Security of Weapons Material Back in the Political
Spotlight, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 20-21, 1994, at 8.
5 See Duffy & Trimble, supra note 35, at 46.
See Shipman, supra note 26 (noting that smugglers do not face
rigid customs controls as during Soviet times; both internal and
external borders are now porous); see also Hersh, supra note 9, at 68
(discussing organized crime's potential for huge profit in the nuclear
stockpiles and noting that the Russian government cannot account for
all of its bombs and weapons-grade uranium and plutonium); Masland,
supra note 10, at 32 (warning that managers at the Institute of Power
Engineering Problems in Belarus privately acknowledge that they
cannot measure the precise amount of highly enriched uranium in their
facility, largely because of inaccurate accounting procedures).
61 Hersh, supra note 9, at 69.
62 See id. at 66.
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4.2. The U.S. Department of Energy Mafia Study
Western officials and analysts have begun heeding the
early warnings that organized crime may threaten nuclear
security in the former Soviet republics. 63 The U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy's ("DOE") November 1993 mafia study
("DOE Mafia Study") is a prominent illustration of Western
nations' increasing concern with organized crime's access to
nuclear weapons.64 The DOE Mafia Study represents "the
first step in what has become a large effort to collect
intelligence on the potential nuclear threat from organized
crime in Russia and the former Soviet republics."65  The
report notes that investigators of organized crime confirmed
"'the existence of a latent, potential nuclear smuggling
infrastructure "66 in the former Soviet Union.
In addition to the concerns raised in the DOE Mafia
Study, uneasiness regarding the threat posed by Russian
organized crime is evident at the U.S. government's top
nuclear non-proliferation intelligence unit. Analysts in this
unit, the DOE's Z Division at the Livermore Laboratory in
California, are currently conducting an extensive review of
the potential nuclear threat from organized crime groups in
Russia.67 Moreover, the press recently has published
several accounts of attempted black market purchases by
undercover reporters.6" These reports, when viewed in
' See generally id. at 66-82 (indicating that concern over the threat
of organized crime in Russia has spread to U.S. nuclear non-prolifera-
tion intelligence units, such as the Department of Energy's Z Division
at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory).
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
Hersh, supra note 9, at 66.
Id. at 75 (quoting the DOE Mafia Study). The DOE Mafia Study
quotes an Eastern European expert on terrorism who stated that, in
addition to dealing in narcotics, the leaders of the Russian and Italian
mafia have agreed to create "'plans to smuggle nuclear weapons-grade
material out of Russia along routes used in [the] drug trade.' Id.
(quoting the DOE Mafia Study). The report warns that "[gliven a high
enough profit motive, the Russian mafia may conclude ... that the
health and law enforcement risks are worth running." Id.
' See id. at 74.
6 In 1993, for example, Kirill Belyaninov, an "investigative reporter
for Literaturnaya Gazeta, Moscow's most respected weekly newsmaga-
zine, went underground with two colleagues inside Russia." Id.
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conjunction with the Z Division's on-going investigations,
lend credence to the DOE's concerns that Russian criminal
networks already possess fissile material.
4.3. The Brain Drain Aspect
Russian "brain drain"69 further complicates the dangers
posed by Russian organized crime and nuclear proliferation.
Before the Soviet Union collapsed, the Soviet empire's
"scientists, engineers, and technicians developed and
maintained the largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the
world." ° Since communism's fall, however, these once
pampered and privileged intellectuals have experienced a
substantial loss of economic and social status.71 Positions
which were previously some of the most highly valued jobs
in the Soviet Union now either offer minimal compensation
or do not exist at all. Furthermore, the intellectual chal-
lenges that also made these jobs appealing are no longer
Months of dealings paid off when he and his colleagues were offered the
warhead from a Soviet SS-20 nuclear missile for $70,000. Id.
Additionally, in the book Critical Mass, authors William Burrows
and Robert Windrem write about "an incident in 1991 in which... a
nuclear weapons analyst affiliated with Greenpeace, nearly obtained a
tactical nuclear warhead from a Soviet senior lieutenant stationed in
Germany." Nunn Statement, supra note 8. The asking price for the
warhead was $320,000. Id. If Greenpeace can come so close to
obtaining a nuclear warhead, organized crime, which controls much of
the Russian economy, is likely to be able to do the same. See id.
S'"Brain drain' describes the potential problem of Russian nuclear
scientists emigrating to certain non-nuclear nations for the purpose of
aiding in the development of a nuclear weapons program." Treiger,
supra note 18, at 238-39 (citations omitted). In this Comment, the term
also describes the situation in which Russian nuclear scientists sell
their knowledge or expertise in the nuclear field to any bidder,
including organized criminal syndicates.
'0 Id. at 237 (citation omitted).
71 At Minatom, a giant Russian military installation, the approxi-
mately one million employees were "[o]nce pampered with comfortable
housing and abundant food" and thus were known as the "chocolate
eaters." Masland, supra note 10, at 31-32. In the last four years,
Minatom employees lost "their perks and most of their pay. [Russia's]
3,000 top atomic scientists are paid less than Moscow bus drivers -
when they're paid at all." Id. at 32. Technicians and service workers
also experienced declining standards of living. Id.
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present.72
Organized crime is linked closely to the brain drain
aspect of nuclear proliferation." 'Mass unemployment" is
now rampant "among a highly educated and technically
proficient part of the population" in Russia.74 Soviet
nuclear scientists who had grown accustomed to their
favored lifestyle have become disillusioned and angered by
their sudden fall. This disenchantment provides an
attractive opportunity for criminal syndicates that seek to
smuggle fissile materials. Nuclear "[sImugglers obviously
need connections inside the nuclear industry, and workers
disgruntled by a loss of prestige and pay are prime tar-
gets."75 In light of the sense of frustration and deprivation
that pervades Russia's nuclear community, organized crime
enjoys an enormous economic influence over these poorly
paid workers. The syndicates have the potential to attract
desperate scientists and technicians with the lure of
renewed prosperity in exchange for nuclear expertise and
materials.
72 See Treiger, supra note 18, at 238. Many scientists have lost
their jobs altogether. "Over the last two years the program[] for the
development of new-generation weapons [laregly] has been axed, ....
testing grounds have been closed down[,] and production in four of the
10 'nuclear' cities has been suspended." Id. Currently, these once
high-level physicists are designing "new kinds of iceboxes and producing
baby buggies 'under [the Russiani conversion program[].'" Id. (quoting
Worries Expressed Over Export of Nuclear Expertise, (BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Jan. 15, 1992), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File) (citations omitted).
" Some in the Russian scientific community, however, refute the
link between the brain drain problem and organized crime, finding such
fear to be based on "irrational assumptions and stereotypes." Sergei
Kapitza, Debunking the Latest Red Scare, HARPER'S, July 1992, at 15.
Sergei Kapitza, a physics professor at the Academy of Sciences in
Moscow, argues that despite the current situation, singling out Russian
nuclear scientists from their Western counterparts as potential sources
of nuclear proliferation is "an expression of distrust if not a direct
insult." Id. at 15-16. Kapitza is doubtful that "people of creativity and
imagination [would] ... find satisfaction in serving an outlaw." Id. at
16. He insists that the issue turns on personal responsibility and
morality. See id. Kapitza concludes that "[p]erhaps morals do recede
when arms and money are in the forefront. Somehow, though, I have
greater trust in my colleagues, and in humankind." Id.
See Goodby, supra note 1, at 704.
s Shipman, supra note 26.
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The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
("OTA") currently is studying Russian nuclear security and
brain drain under a 1993 mandate to investigate problems
of nuclear proliferation in the former Soviet Union.76 The
OTA's initial findings have caused great concern among
Western analysts. The findings confirm suggestions that
the dispersal of Russian nuclear scientists is no longer
speculation 77 and has become a genuine and tangible
threat to international security.
5. OBSTACLES IN COMBATTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
BY ORGANIZED CRIME AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
At first glance, the quickly growing problem of Russian
organized crime appears to be a domestic issue. Upon
closer examination, however, it is evident that this alarm-
ing Russian criminal movement poses an enormous threat
to the security of all nations. The United States recognized
the possibility for such global interdependence over twenty
years ago when the U.S. State Department warned that
"[tihe increasing complexity of modern society and interde-
pendence among nations require international solutions to
problems which once could be dealt with at the national
level."7" Western nations and the former Soviet republics
must work together to promote widespread cooperative
action in order to control this new and deadly threat.
5.1. Weak Russian Legal System
One significant problem relating to Russian organized
71 See Hersh, supra note 9, at 76.
" For example, scientists at the Federal Nuclear Research Center
Arzamas-16, a Russian nuclear-weapons laboratory nearly rebelled
"over the lack of such basic amenities as housing, health care, and
regular paychecks." Id. The competence and knowledge of these
scientists, who publicly demonstrated during the summer of 1993 in
order to get paid, is equivalent to that of their U.S. counterparts at Los
Alamos. See id. Additionally, in June 1995, the Russian scientists
protested for several days "when they abruptly were reduced to a
poverty allowance, in lieu of salaries that had gone unpaid for months."
Hotz, supra note 14, at A30.
78 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8699, UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY 1972: A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 129 (1973).
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crime and nuclear proliferation is the lack of a Russian
legal system. 9 Given the weakness of Russia's legal
infrastructure, the Russian government does not have the
ability to punish offenders who participate in black market
smuggling schemes arranged by organized criminal syndi-
cates.
The dissolution of legal authority in the former Soviet
republics is an issue of primary concern. The Soviet
Union's rapid disintegration "imperils the system that
safeguarded the Soviet nuclear arsenal for more than forty
years without major incident."0  Legal and political
fragmentation strain the former Soviet nuclear custodial
system, which, although outdated, is still largely in place
today.8 " "No nuclear custodial system is designed to
protect against revolution, [and] the disappearance of the
political actor [or entity] that created it .... Yet these are
exactly the conditions challenging the continued security of
... [the nuclear weapons] deployed across the former Soviet
Union."
8 2
One step that should be taken in the cooperative effort
to attack the problem83 of Russia's weak legal infrastruc-
ture is the institution of universal jurisdiction over perpe-
trators of international terrorism.9s  Almost all interna-
See discussion supra section 3.2.
s Lee S. Wolosky et al., START, START II, and Ownership of
Nuclear Weapons: The Case for a "Primaly" Successor State, 34 HARV.
INTL L.J. 581, 581 (1993).
8" Nikolai N. Ponomaryov-Stepnoi, the Vice-President of the Russian
Kurchatov Institute Scientific Center, discussed the problem at a press
conference on August 23, 1994. See Press Conference on Thefts of
Nuclear Material (Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Aug. 23, 1994)
available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. Ponomaryov-Stepnoi
asserted that the old patterns of protection worked very well in the
Soviet days of "iron discipline," but are no longer effective under current
conditions. Id. Now that a market for such material exists, escaping
punishment for theft is relatively simple. See id.
82 Wolosky et al., supra note 80, at 581.
s Of course, the problems created by the lack of legal infrastructure
will, to a great extent, only be resolved when the new nations created
out of the former Soviet empire have had time to develop their own set
of persuasive and authoritative legal norms.
" See generally Jordan J. Paust, A Survey of Possible Legal
Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment, and
Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 431, 431-69 (1975)
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tional instruments that prohibit terrorism have adopted
this principle. For example, under the Geneva Convention,
most intentional acts of terrorism are covered by provisions
prescribing universal jurisdiction.85 According to the
principle of universal jurisdiction, once a country becomes
aware of an offender within its borders, it must act quickly
to arrest and to prosecute the person.86 Nuclear smug-
gling by the "atomic mafia" should be considered terrorism
which is subject to universal jurisdiction. This type of
offense is harmful to all of humanity. Unilateral action on
the part of one state cannot alter the universal nature of
these crimes.8
The U.S. government has displayed strong support for
universal jurisdiction over international terrorists.88 The
United States views universal jurisdiction "as an 'important
contribution to be made by international law... aimed at
deterring terrorist acts by eliminating any safe haven for
the perpetrators."" This position finds additional support
in the widely recognized principle that "[e]very state has
the duty to refrain from ... acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed towards the commis-
sion of such acts" of civil strife or terrorism. 0 Under a
(discussing the related problems of international terrorism and aircraft
hijacking as examples where international law effectively promoted
cooperative investigation and prosecution of transnational criminal
acts).
'5 See id. at 452 n.84 and accompanying text (quoting Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, 3 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287).
86 See id. at 452 (citation omitted).
17 See id. (citation omitted).
" Id. One example of U.S. support for this principle is found in An
Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the
Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L.
No. 93-377, 88 Stat. 472, 13 I.L.M. 1217 (1974), cited in Coleman, supra
note 55, at 510. In this Act, passed in 1974, a reward of up to $500,000
is offered to anyone who furnishes original information to the United
States concerning the discovery of nuclear sabotage and theft before the
theft or sabotage occurs. See id.
89 Paust, supra note 84, at 452-53 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PUB. No. 8689, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMBATING
TERRORISM 5 (1973)).
0 Paust, supra note 84, at 459 (citing Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
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system of universal jurisdiction, the country in which the
criminal syndicate originates may itself lack the legal
infrastructure to apprehend nuclear smugglers. This
condition, however, will not prevent any other nation in
whose territory the criminal networks operate from arrest-
ing and prosecuting the nuclear smugglers.
Another means of minimizing the effect of Russia's weak
legal system is to monitor former Soviet nuclear material by
means of international non-proliferation agreements. The
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT" or "Treaty"), which
has been signed by the CIS nations and the United
States,9 1 provides one of the most promising international
means of monitoring nuclear proliferation within the CIS.
To fill this role, however, signatories must increase greatly
the Treaty's punishments for violators. This point was
made poignantly during the Persian Gulf War, when the
world realized that Iraq had secretly built a nuclear
arsenal, violating the NPT with impunity for many
years.92 To prevent this type of situation from recurring,
NPT violations must be deterred by a form of international
punishment.9 3
Several types of punishment have been proposed. One
alternative is "international isolation" of countries that
violate the NPT, which would be carried out through United
Nations sanctions.94 While sanctions against a violating
country are a possibility, enforcement would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible.95 A narrowly defined system of
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970)). A similar proscription prohibits related attempts to"organize, assist,... finance,... or tolerate subversive, terrorist[,] or
armed activities." Id.
"' For a discussion of the NPT and its main provisions, see infra
notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
" See Levin, supra note 3, at 977.
9 Id. at 978. Hans Dietrich Genscher, the German Foreign
Minister, suggested that United Nations sanctions should be imposed
against NPT violators. See id.
9 See id. (noting that goods were still able to reach Iraq during the
Persian Gulf War, even though the general consensus of United Nations
members favored sanctions against Iraq).
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sanctions, however, may prove to be a viable option.9"
Whatever form of international punishment is chosen, the
crucial element of enforcement is the awareness on the part
of potential violators that no acceptable excuse exists for
violating a voluntarily signed international treaty.
Western nations thus can use international mechanisms
to help bolster Russia's weak internal legal system. U.S.
policies which impose universal jurisdiction over perpetra-
tors of international terrorism provide support for institut-
ing a policy of universal jurisdiction over acts of nuclear
smuggling. In addition, Western nations can monitor
nuclear proliferation within former Soviet territory through
the use of international non-proliferation agreements.
5.2. Porous Borders and Export Controls
The weak export controls and extremely porous borders
of the former Soviet republics further complicate the effort
to combat nuclear proliferation by Russian organized
crime.9" The collapse of the Soviet empire presents entire-
ly new difficulties in the area of export control. Many of
the former Soviet republics have significant nuclear
arsenals and facilities within their borders.9" Except for
Russia, however, these new nations possess "limited
political or technical capacity to formulate or enforce" the
kinds of nuclear non-proliferation policies that are currently
embodied in the non-proliferation treaties.99
96 See id. A form of limited sanctions where countries agreed not to
do business with the violating country, such as those imposed upon
South Africa, might be an effective deterrent in preventing states from
violating the NPT. See id.
' See Shipman, supra note 26 (noting that smugglers do not face
the rigid customs controls of the past because both internal and
external borders are now more porous).
" For example, upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, "Ukraine
immediately became the world's third-largest nuclear power, with more
weapons than Britain, France, and China combined." Wolosky et al.,
supra note 80, at 581.
9 Deutch, supra note 13, at 129. In addition, Deutch notes that
"desperate economic conditions in these countries provide considerable
incentive for individuals, laboratories, or factories to profit by exporting
nuclear materials and technology." Id. For a discussion of non-prolif-
eration treaties currently in force, see infra notes 101-08 and accompa-
nying text.
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The United States and several of the CIS nations have
signed many bilateral and multilateral nuclear non-prolif-
eration treaties during the last few years. Some of these
treaties, if strictly followed by the signatories, could be used
as a means of strengthening border and export controls in
the CIS. The first and most important of these agreements
is the NPT."' Signed in 1968, the Treaty is the corner-
stone of international nuclear non-proliferation efforts. 10 '
Although adherence to the NPT is only voluntary, more
than 170 countries have signed the Treaty, making it one
of the most widely acceded to treaties on any subject.0 2
Moreover, in May 1995, by agreeing to renew indefinitely
the Treaty, the signatories made the NPT and its provisions
permanent.
10 3
Despite great international pressure, Ukraine had
refused to sign the NPT for quite some time. Following a
period of uncertainty,'0 Ukraine finally agreed to become
a party to the Treaty in 1994.5 In so doing, Ukraine
100 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 283, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter
NPTI.
101 See Lynn E. Davis, Preventing the Proliferation of Dangerous
Arms, Address before the Atlantic Council (Dec. 8, 1994) (transcript
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Dstate File). The following are the
significant provisions of the NPT:
1. each non-nuclear-weapon state which is a Party to the Treaty
agrees not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or any
nuclear explosive device (NPT, Article II);
2. each non-nuclear-weapon Party is required to submit to IAEAsafeguards through negotiations with the Agency to be begun
within specified time limits (NPT, Article III.§ 1, § 4);3. each nuclear-weapon Party aIees not to supply any non-nu-
clear-weapon state (whether a a or not) with certain typesof nucl r items for peaceful purposes, except subj c  to IAEA
safeguards (NPT, Article III.-§ 2).
Coleman, supra note 55, at 502-03.
102 See Williamson, supra note 21, at 122.
l See Norman Kempster, Nations Agree to Make Nuclear Pact
Permanent, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1995, at Al.
104 See generally Wolosky et al., supra note 80, at 583 (indicating
that Ukraine's initial refusal to sign the NPT imposed great obstacles
to achieving the denuclearization regime envisioned by the drafters of
the NPT).
105 See Davis, supra note 101 (noting that Ukraine's decision, along
with those of Belarus and Kazakhstan, allowed "the START I treaty to
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promised either to hand over the nuclear warheads within
its territory to Russia or to dismantle and destroy the
strategic missile systems under its control.'0 6 Ukraine's
accession to the NPT paved the way for the 1994 ratifica-
tion of the important START I treaty 7 between the
United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine.
08
The problems of poorly policed borders and minimal
export controls require a cooperative effort by Western
nations and the former Soviet republics.0 9 The newly
independent states must create completely new domestic
laws regulating the materials that can cross their borders.
In this effort, they will be aided greatly by Western assis-
tance "in designing, establishing, or improving export
control systems to prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and related technologies."" 0 Ukraine's
signing of the NPT and the implementation of START I
provide hope for the success of legal and technological
enter into force").
106 See id.
.07 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-Russia, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 20, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter START I].
108 Together with START II, which had-been set for ratification in
the first half of 1995, see Davis, supra note 101, implementation of
START I commits the United States and the CIS signatories to a
denuclearization program that would "reduce aggregate strategic
warhead levels from approximately 10,000-12,000 to 3000-3500 per side;
eliminate completely the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons
manufactured during the Cold War; ... and ... help assure a
centralized, Moscow-based command and control over remaining nuclear
weapons to guard against accidental loss or unauthorized use."
Wolosky et al., supra note 80, at 582 (citations omitted). As of early
September 1995, however, the U.S. Senate was not prepared to ratify
START II. See Barbara Crossette, Chemical Treaty Appears on Hold in
the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, at 12.
109 Of course, international measures cannot replace a nuclear
nation's domestic efforts. According to a senior official at the U.N.'s
International Atomic Energy Agency, to counter the threat of smuggling
fissile materials, 'there is no substitute for the work of the police
forces, border patrols, and customs services of individual nations and
their intelligence resources."' Thom Shanker, Nuclear Smuggling:
Global Peril, Local Problem, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1994, at 5C.
10 Goodby, supra note 1, at 705 (noting that the United States has
begun discussions on cooperation in this matter with some of the former
Soviet republics, including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine).
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structures which control nuclear weapons transfer.
Providing support and monitoring compliance will be
essential to the success of these efforts. Cooperation with
the West is critical because the United States and Western
European nations have experience in designing export
control regimes and can assist the new nations in monitor-
ing exports and policing borders.
5.3. Material Control and Accountability
Perhaps the biggest and most urgent problem is account-
ing for and protecting nuclear material currently in Russia
and the other former Soviet republics. Many Westerners
believe that the CIS is the source of the fissile material
diverted to Europe."' To be successful, nuclear non-pro-
liferation policies require "a strict and secure system to
protect nuclear materials against theft, diversion, loss, or
unauthorized use.""2 It is precisely this physical protec-
tion system that the newly independent states lack.'
Security has completely broken down at the former
Soviet nuclear research institutes and laboratories, where
the governments of the newly independent states trust
employees to account for the nuclear material on their
own.1 This problem is related intricately to the social
and political turmoil that the newly independent nations
have experienced since the empire's collapse." 5 Maintain-
... See State Department Regular Briefing (Aug. 17, 1994)
(statement of Mike McCurry), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script
File [hereinafter McCurry Statement].
11 Goodby, supra note 1, at 705.
.. One Russian official commented facetiously that the Soviet
Union's nuclear sites "used to be guarded by stern KGB agents with
machine guns," but now, security is only "'a babushka in a hut with a
key. And she's gone home." Masland, supra note 10, at 31.
.. At his February 1995 trial in Murmansk, Russian Navy
Lieutenant Colonel Alexei Tikhomirov admitted stealing four kilograms
of uranium with the intent to sell it for $50,000. See Russian Uranium
Simple to Steal, Court is Told, REUTERS WORLD SERvICE, Feb. 15, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Tikhomirov told the
court that w[t]he importance of this [theft] is not the crime itself....
It's how this extremely radioactive material is guarded - how... easy
it is for people to get hold of it.'" Id.
"' See discussion supra section 3.1.
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ing tight security over valuable material for any length of
time is extremely difficult when accountability systems no
longer exist."6
Creating an inventory control system basically is
impossible because the Russians themselves do not know
how much nuclear material the former Soviet Union
produced." 7 Until an initial inventory is made, however,
accounting for any movements of nuclear material, either
within Russia or across its borders, will not be feasible."1 8
The United States and Russia currently are engaged in
a cooperative effort to improve the control, accounting, and
physical protection of fissile material. U.S. and Russian
weapons scientists are working together on dozens of non-
military research projects in Russia and the United
States."9  These scientists also have joined efforts to
control nuclear technology scattered across Russia. Special-
ists at the U.S. national laboratory in Los Alamos, for
example, have introduced their Russian colleagues to
computerized inventory controls and electronic security
measures in order to help secure Russia's nuclear arse-
nal.
1 2 0
Moreover, Congress has enacted the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Act, or Nunn-Lugar Program,'12 to help the
former Soviet republics downsize their nuclear pro-
grams.12 ' This Act includes financial assistance intended
116 See MacNeil/Lehrer, supra note 12. One U.S. official monitoring
Russian laboratories said nuclear material was as available as '"a book
in the library. ... [and] [n]o one will tell you the book is overdue.'"
Masland, supra note 10, at 32. Some Russian laboratories have not
verified their inventories within the past decade. See id.
117 See MacNeillLehrer, supra note 12.
118 See id.
119 See Hotz, supra note 14, at Al.
120 See id. at A30.
121 See Richard Lugar, Nuclear Smuggling Poses Terrorist Threat,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
12 See MacNeillLehrer, supra note 12 (noting that the United
States and Russia are negotiating a $30 million agreement to address,
among other issues, the security of, and accountability for, fissile
materials); see also McCurry Statement, supra note 111 (indicating that
the United States has offered to provide Russia up to $30 million for
immediate improvements in security and accounting of nuclear
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to help secure stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium against .theft. For example, some of the aid is
earmarked for the installation of detectors in laboratories
to ensure that no one leaves with fissile material on his or
her person.'23
While the Nunn-Lugar Program has had moderate
success in helping the Russians eliminate some of their
nuclear inventories, the legislation "was not created to deal
with the immense size and scope of the nuclear leakage
problem."124 To a great extent, therefore, neither Russia
nor the United States has benefitted from this as-
sistance.'2 5 Furthermore, problems of implementation
have played a large role in preventing the Nunn-Lugar
Program from achieving its goals.'26 Security concerns
and Cold War-era laws have prevented the expenditure of
millions of dollars that Congress approved to help curtail
nuclear smuggling.
27
5.3.1. "Project Sapphire"
In the areas of material control and accounting, one
successful cooperative effort between the East and the West
suggests an effective model for the future. The successful
materials in Russia).
" See Charles, supra note 24.
124 Lugar, supra note 121.
r See Charles, supra note 24. The projected assistance largely has
not materialized as planned. See id. Political obstacles in the United
States have blocked a great deal of the authorized money from reaching
its intended targets in the CIS. See id.
"6 Russia's domestic political problems have prevented its govern-
ment from fully implementing the small amount of aid that Western
nations have delivered. In addition, many Russians still view Western
aid with skepticism and remain gripped by the fear that an offer of help
from the United States is a '"idden effort to keep Russia weak... to
make sure Russia does not ever build up its power again.' Hotz, supra
note 14, at A30 (quoting Loren R. Graham, an authority on science in
Russia at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology); see also Charles,
supra note 24 (reporting that the funds which had been authorized for
denuclearization, including funds for material control and accounting,
had not been delivered to the intended targets).
127 See id. U.S. laws during the Cold War prevented the U.S.
government from paying Russians, and the Russians refused to allow
.S. citizens onto their nuclear sites without reciprocal visits. See id.
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operation took place in November 1994, in the former Soviet
republic of Kazakhstan.12' The mission, code-named
"Project Sapphire,"'2 9 involved the airlift to the United
States of a half ton of enriched uranium, enough to build
twenty nuclear bombs.13 ° The material was discovered in
a poorly guarded warehouse in southeastern Kazakhstan.
Under the direction of U.S. nuclear engineers, the uranium
was extracted from a cache of nuclear material and sent to
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for reprocessing into harmless
commercial-grade uranium.' In return for its agreement
to ship the uranium out of Kazakhstan, the Kazakh
government will receive an aid package consisting of
compensation and technical assistance from the United
States.3 2
The successful cooperation between the United States
and Kazakhstan in Project Sapphire led to the relocation of
the largest cache of uranium from a former Soviet republic
to the United States. 33 By putting the fissile material
out of the reach of organized crime syndicates and potential
black marketeers,3 this type of mission presents a viable
and successful solution to the enormous problem of protect-
ing fissile material from the "atomic mafia."
A similar cooperative arrangement was reached with the
Russian government in August 1992, when the Bush
Administration announced a twenty-year accord to purchase
128 Columnists praised the operation and emphasized its importance.
Mission Leaders Should Be on Call, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
Nov. 26, 1994, at 20A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File
[hereinafter Mission Leaders]. The grim and real prospect of bomb-
grade uranium being stolen and going to terrorists or rogue nations has
kept Western political leaders and scientists on edge. Id. That worry
became the driving force behind a secret mission in Kazakhstan in
which a half ton of nuclear material was flown to a safe refuge in 6ak
Ridge, Tennessee. Id.
'9 Art Pine, U.S. Takes over Uranium Cache from Kazakhs, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1994, at Al, A9.
130 See id.
131 See Mission Leaders, supra note 128, at 20A.
132 See Davis, supra note 101.
'3 See Pine, supra note 129, at A9.
14 See David Osborne, US Airlifts Out Cache of Kazakh Uranium,
INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 24, 1994, at 18, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Papers File.
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500 metric tons of bomb-grade uranium which were to be
removed from Russia's discarded nuclear weapons, for use
in U.S. civil reactors.'35 The Enrichment Corporation of
Bethesda, Maryland, won the contract to effectuate the
deal." 6 The Enrichment Corporation, however, subse-
quently has reached a deadlock with the Russian Ministry
of Atomic Energy over pricing. Three years after it was
announced, unfortunately, the accord appears lost in a
"quagmire of incompetent implementation" and is "in
danger of coming completely undone."
3 7
Expecting the former Soviet republics to give away all of
their nuclear arms by shipping them to the United States
is impractical. Large East-West transfers of nuclear
material therefore only can be used to supplement other
regulatory programs which would permit the CIS to retain
some of its nuclear material within the territory of the
former Soviet Union. Thus, the United States and the CIS
nations must utilize nuclear non-proliferation treaties to
eliminate the threat posed by the black market for nuclear
materials. 3 ' For example, under the NPT, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan have agreed to transfer many of
their nuclear warheads to Russia. 8 By insuring compli-
ance with the NPT, the United States can help Russia
establish a centralized, Moscow-based system of control over
the nuclear weapons remaining in former Soviet territo-
ry,'40 thereby decreasing the chance of theft. Programs
like Project Sapphire will work best in conjunction with
international monitoring through non-proliferation agree-
ments.
' See William J. Broad, Experts See Peril for U.S. Pact to Buy Up
Russian Bomb Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1995, at Al, A6.
136 See id.
137 Id. (quoting Richard A. Falkenrath, a fellow at the Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard University). During their
July 1995 meeting in Moscow, Vice President Gore and Russian Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin set a November 1995 deadline to conclude the
deal. See Josh Friedman, The New Nuclear Threat, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
138 See discussion supra section 5.2.
139 See Davis, supra note 101.
140 See Wolosky et al., supra note 80, at 582.
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5.4. The Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency
A final potential solution to the linked problems of
Russian organized crime and nuclear proliferation is the
establishment of an international agency to guard against
the black market in fissile materials.14 ' The International
Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA" or "Agency"), the nuclear
watchdog of the United Nations,142 is the obvious choice
for such a role. Created in 1957 to insure the peaceful use
of nuclear materials, the IAEA has experience in monitoring
nuclear sources in its role as the U.N.'s chief guardian
against violations of non-proliferation treaties." The
Agency plays a central role in enforcing the
non-proliferation treaties because it has the power to
inspect nuclear facilities and account for nuclear materi-
als.
4 4
Although the JAEA traditionally has lacked police
powers, 45 its present leadership has expressed willing-
ness to assume a more aggressive role in monitoring and
inspecting nuclear facilities. 146 For example, the Director
General has announced that the Agency has authority to
conduct special inspections anywhere in an NPT signatory
141 In September 1994, President Clinton and Russian President
Yeltsin concluded their summit in Washington by calling for an
international agency to protect Russian nuclear stockpiles from being
stolen or illegally diverted. See Shanker, supra note 109, at 5.
142 See id.
14 The traditional role of the IAEA has been to maintain the
distinction between civilian and military applications of nuclear
materials by inspection of civilian nuclear facilities. See Deutch, supra
note 13, at 122. When the Agency conducts inspections, however, it
limits the scope of inspection to accounting for the amount of nuclear
material produced at and held by the particular nuclear facility. Id.
14 See Williamson, supra note 21, at 120.
14 See Shanker, supra note 109, at 5; see also Levin, supra note 3,
at 973 (noting that the IAEA has been able to inspect a country's
facility only after it receives permission to do so from the host
government).
146 See, e.g., Deutch, supra note 13, at 129. Notably, the IAEA
General Conference passed a resolution in November 1994 to involve
the Agency in the prevention of nuclear smuggling. See Mark Hibbs,
IAEA Role in Containing Smuggling Will be Limited, Blix Says,
NUCLEONICS WK., Oct. 6, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Nwltrs File.
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if such inspections are deemed to be "reasonably necessary
to verify that all nuclear material is under safeguards." 47
If the IAEA is given the power in the future to carry out its
broadened mandate, the Agency likely will play a signifi-
cant role in the prevention of smuggling and diversion from
former Soviet nuclear facilities. Enlarging the scope of
IAEA inspections and enabling the Agency to act on them
will put the Agency in a better position to monitor compli-
ance with non-proliferation treaties such as the NPT."'
By broadening its power to inspect nuclear sites, the IAEA
can become a highly effective mechanism by which to
safeguard deadly fissile material against powerful organized
criminal networks.'4 9
6. CONCLUSION
There is perhaps no aspect of international law that is
more important to humanity today than the prevention of
illicit proliferation of nuclear weapons from former Soviet
arsenals. 5 ' The stress of the Soviet empire's collapse
weakened Russia's ability to maintain control over its
nuclear weapons and associated technologies. Russia's
economy has deteriorated while its political institutions
have struggled to maintain a modicum of authority "and
leadership. At the same time, the nation's weak legal
system has hindered the government's ability to apprehend
and punish those who are tempted by the lure of large
147 Williamson, supra note 21, at 127 n.222.
148 See Levin, supra note 3, at 974 (arguing for a larger IAEA
budget and more inspections as a means of making the agency more
effective).
149 Some argue that the IAEA cannot take on a police-like role in
controlling nuclear proliferation. Hans Blix, the Agency's Director
General, asserts that the Agency is "not a police organization" and that,
while the Agency may have an auxiliary role to play, it will not be given
new responsibilities in the area of physical protection of nuclear
materials. Hibbs, supra note 146, at 10.
150 See B.S. Chimni, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Some
Reflections, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TRANSITION 137, 141 (R.S.
Pathak & R.P. Dhokalia eds., 1992) (quoting H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 188 (1961) (warning that the world's 'concern is with social
arrangements for continued existence, not with those of a suicide
club'")).
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profits for stolen nuclear materials.
Journalists in the United States have highlighted
dramatically the enormous danger posed by the turmoil in
Russia. In a recently published investigative report, two
U.S. news agencies uncovered the first hard evidence that
Russian crime syndicates already have attempted to
smuggle nuclear-related materials from the former Soviet
Union. 5' By tracing the path of a shipment of a nuclear-
related material called beryllium, which police in Lithuania
had seized in May 1993, the journalists found "irrefutable
proof' that Russian organized crime was behind the
shipment.
15 2
In light of the palpable threat that Russia's turbulent
domestic situation poses to international security, Eastern
and Western nations clearly need to work together to
combat Russian organized crime and protect Russia's fissile
material. The international system can no longer leave
responsibility for protection of nuclear materials in the
hands of each individual nation. Russia's system is too
weak and thus is inadequate to safeguard its enormous
inventory of nuclear weapons. Without assistance from the
West, the possibility of successful nuclear diversion from
Russian facilities by organized criminal networks is
alarmingly real.
Post-communist Russia provides fertile ground for
organized criminal syndicates to prosper. Western nations,
working jointly with the former Soviet republics, can take
a variety of actions to control this new and unprecedented
global danger. Project Sapphire and similar operations in
which the United States will buy fissile material from
deactivated weapons are among the most promising. Such
programs, if used to supplement international monitoring
through non-proliferation treaties, will establish a strong
first step in attacking the new global threat.
Despite early optimism, the end of the Cold War has not
151 See Tom Zimmerman & Alan Cooperman, The Russian Connec-
tion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 58. This
investigative report represents the culmination of a cooperative effort
between CBS News' "60 Minutes" and reporters from U.S. News &
World Report.
152 Id.
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significantly decreased the risk of nuclear war. The joint
investigation that traced the path of beryllium found in
Lithuania leads to the frightening realization that "the
impossible has happened" 5 ' - diversion from Russian
nuclear facilities has already occurred. To assure that the
incidence and magnitude of such smuggling do not escalate
in the future, both the East and the West must work
together to develop the domestic legal systems of the
countries susceptible to the problem of nuclear smuggling,
to improve export control regimes, and to strengthen
material control and accounting systems. The future
security of all nations depends upon this cooperative effort.
153 Id.
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